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Abstract 
 
Located at the ancient sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi is a collection of inscriptions that detail the sales of 
slaves by their owners to the god Apollo. In reality, these slaves were purchasing their freedom, and the 
Delphic inscriptions are the manumission contracts between slave and slave owner. But how did the 
Greeks reconcile the integration of slaves into free civilization with their established systems and 
rationalizations surrounding slavery? My project investigates the Delphic approach to manumission, 
using the manumission inscriptions in conjunction with evidence from other locales to examine the 
circumstances and methods that would enable a slave to achieve freedom through the Delphic procedure. 
Close reading and consideration of these inscriptions reveal a tension between the many advantages 
manumission offered to slaveowners, and the centuries of alienation and objectification of the slave figure 
to the appellation of merely σῶµα ("body"). This tension, and other evidence of Greek discomfort and 
anxiety concerning boundary-crossing and categorical dilemmas, may help explain the strange role of the 
god in the Delphic epigraphy. 
 
 Ancient Greece was not only a society dependent on slave labor, but also one that took 
the enslavement of other human beings for granted as a fact of human life.1 Yet there is ample 
evidence—some literary, but primarily epigraphic—that there existed the opportunity for an 
escape from servitude in Greece, and that manumission may even have been a commonplace 
practice. Notably, the evidence for manumission is more limited in larger cities like Athens, 
Corinth, and Thebes; most of the known manumission inscriptions have been found in other 
regions of northern and central Greece, including locations like Thessaly, Boeotia, Elateia, and 
Phocis. The Delphic sanctuary of Apollo houses the largest of these epigraphic collections.2 The 
degree to which the evidence from Delphi, or indeed from any of these places, is representative 
of Greek manumission as a whole is still up for debate, due to the scattered nature of the 
evidence (perhaps as a result of these regions’ particular recording habits) and its confinement to 
particular periods of time. In other words, a location’s manumission inscriptions can only really 
speak to the manumission procedure of that location at that time, at least without a comparative 
study.3  
                                               
1 Finley, “Was Greek Civilization Based on Greek Labour?,” in Slavery in Classical Antiquity, ed. Moses Finley 
(Cambridge: Heffer, 1968) 53.  
2 Zelnick-Abramovitz, Not Wholly Free : The Concept of Manumission and the Status of Manumitted Slaves in the 
Ancient Greek World (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 2-3. 
3 Ibid.  
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 Still, the individual collections are informatively fruitful, especially one as abundant and 
detailed as Delphi’s. Of particular interest for this discussion is the representation of the slave in 
the majority of Delphic manumission inscriptions by the word σῶµα (“body”), which provides an 
unfortunate reminder of the initial status that he or she occupied in servitude. How did the 
Greeks approach the transformation of a σῶµα—a slave alienated, objectified, and stripped of 
legal rights to the point of being what Patterson labels “socially dead”4—into a free human 
being? How was this even possible logically and logistically in a society that participated in the 
systematic subjugation and exploitation of masses of people?  The inscriptions at Delphi are 
valuable resources for examining how the Greeks effected the manumission of slaves, and how 
they conceived of manumission.  
 
 
Overview of the Delphic Manumission Epigraphy 
 
 The body of manumission inscriptions in the ancient sanctuary of Delphi records the 
release of over 1200 individuals from slavery. Dating between 201 BCE and roughly 100 CE, the 
inscriptions that survive lie primarily on the polygonal masonry comprising the terrace wall of 
the temple of Apollo—some can also be found in other locations around the site, such as on 
public monuments along the Sacred Way and the theater.5 Through the particular process 
documented at Delphi (the cases of which number over a thousand), manumission took the form 
of the god Pythian Apollo purchasing one or more slaves from a slave owner. In reality, the slave 
bought his or her own freedom and was only nominally the property of the deity.6 Accordingly, 
                                               
4 Patterson, Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 237; 
Zelnick-Abramovitz, 5. 
5 Hopkins, Conquerors and Slaves (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978): 133-134. 
6 Kamen, “Sale for the Purpose of Freedom: Slave-Prostitutes and Manumission in Ancient Greece,” The Classical 
Journal 109 (2014): 285. 
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scholars often refer to these transactions as “fictive sales,”7 “trust sales,”8 or, more broadly, 
“sacral manumission.”9 The inscription recording the manumission of a slave named Ladika is 
fairly typical and can illustrate the standard form of this practice: 
ἄρχοντος Ἐµµενίδα τοῦ Καλλία µηνὸς Δαιδαφορίου, ἀπέδοτο Τελεσὼ Μνασικράτεος 
Δελφίς, συνευδοκέοντος καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ Κλέωνος, τῶι Ἀπόλλωνι τῶι Πυθίωι σῶµα 
γυναικε͂ιον ἇι ὄνοµα Λαδίκα τὸ γένος Σύραν, τιµᾶς ἀργυρίου µνᾶν τριῶν, καὶ τὰν τιµὰν 
ἔχει, καθὼς ἐπίστευσε Λαδίκα τῶι θεῶι τὰν ὠνάν, ἐφ’ ὧιτε ἐλευθέραν εἶµεν καὶ 
ἀνέφαπτον ἀπὸ πάντων τὸν πάντα χρόνον, ποιέουσα ὅ κα θέληι καὶ ἀποτρέχουσα οἷς κα 
θέληι. βεβαιωτὴρ κατὰ τὸν νόµον τᾶς πόλιος· Ἀστόξενος Διονυσίου. εἰ δέ τις ἐφάπτοιτο 
Λαδίκας ἐπὶ καταδουλισµῶι, βέβαιον παρεχόντων τῶι θεῶι τὰν ὠνὰν ἅ τε ἀποδοµένα 
Τελεσὼ καὶ ὁ βεβαιωτὴρ Ἀστόξενος· εἰ δὲ µὴ παρέχοιεν βέβαιον τὰν ὠνὰν τῶι θεῶι, 
πράκτιµοι ἐόντων κατὰ τὸν νόµον. ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ παρατυγχάνοντες κύριοι ἐόντων 
συλέοντες ὡς ἐλευθέραν οὖσαν ἀζάµιοι ἐόντες καὶ ἀνυπόδικοι πάσας δίκας καὶ ζαµίας 
µάρτυρες· τοὶ ἱερεῖς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος Ταραντῖνος, Ἀµύντας καὶ τοὶ ἄρχοντες Ἀριστίων, 
Ἄσανδρος, Ἀριστόµαχος, ἰδιῶται Πατρέας, Εὐκράτης, Ἀστόξενος, Κλέων, Ἀρτεµίδωρος, 
Χαρίξενος.10 
 
While Emmenidas son of Kallias was archon in the month of Daidaphorios, Teleso 
daughter of Mnasikrates of Delphi, with her son Kleon also consenting, sold to Pythian 
Apollo a female body named Ladika, Syrian in origin, for the price of three mnae of 
silver, and [Teleso] holds the payment, accordingly as Ladika entrusted the sale to the 
god, according to which she be free and untouchable by all for all time, doing whatever 
she wishes and going wherever she wishes. The guarantor in accordance with the law of 
the city: Astoxenos son of Dionysios. If anyone should lay hands on Ladika for 
enslavement, let both the seller Teleso and the guarantor Astoxenos provide the sale as 
secure to the god; if they should not provide the sale as secure to the god, let them be 
fined in accordance with the law. Likewise also let bystanders have the power to protect 
her as being free, themselves being unpunished and not liable to any judgment and 
penalty. Witnesses: the priests of Apollo Tarantinos, Amuntas, and the magistrates 
Aristion, Asandros, Aristomachos, and the private citizens Patreas, Eukrates, Astoxenos, 
Kleon, Artemidoros, Charixenos.  
 
 The inscriptions, which are largely formulaic, begin much like other contractual 
epigraphy: they date the sale by month and by specific annual magistracies, and introduce the 
enumeration of conditions upon which the involved parties have agreed. Multiple slave owners 
could play a direct hand in selling the slave, but occasionally other family members appear in the 
                                               
7 Kamen, “Manumission and Slave Allowances in Athens,” Historia 65 (2016): 424. 
8 Westermann, “Between Slavery and Freedom,” The American Historical Review 50 (1945): 215.  
9 Kamen (2014), 285.  
10 SGDI 1735. 
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text as simply συνευδοκέοντος (“consenting”)—this addition, which Westermann labels the 
“approval clause,” most likely protected the freedperson from potential contestations to his or her 
freedom by the slave owner’s heirs in the future.11 These masters were most often from Delphi, a 
smaller but still sizable portion were from central Greece, and some few others came from 
farther locations like Athens or even Macedon.12  
 Next in the document after the name of the slave owner is the description of the sale, 
detailing the amount of money the owner received from the divine buyer, Apollo—a sum that 
really came from the slave, as indicated in the language of the epigraphy: ἐπίστευσε…τῶι θεῶι 
τὰν ὠνάν (“he/she entrusted the sale to the god”). Despite this mention of action undertaken by 
the slave, as an object traded in a transaction he or she is referred to simply as a gendered σῶµα 
(“body”) with a name and occasionally with an origin (only about a fifth of the inscriptions 
specify ethnicity).13 The inscriptions do, however, indicate that Apollo would not be exercising 
his new rights of ownership, for a result of the sale is that the slave ἐλευθέρα εἶµεν καὶ ἀνέφαπτος 
(“is free and untouchable”). 
 The manumission agreements often arranged for multiple layers of protection over this 
new status of the manumitted slaves (which suggests, also, how plausible the dangers were to a 
freedperson’s newfound freedom). One such measure was, as mentioned previously, the written 
approval of the manumission by certain family members of the manumittor, so that they 
renounced any future claim they might have been able to make on the freed slave. The contracts 
also come with witnesses and guarantors, whom the inscriptions specifically name and who were 
acting κατὰ τὸν νόµον τᾶς πόλιος (“in accordance with the law of the city”), suggesting that there 
                                               
11 Westermann, “Extinction of Claims in Slave Sales at Delphi,” Journal of Juristic Papyrology 4 (1950): 58. 
12 Hopkins, 138. 
13 Hopkins, 139. 
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was also a degree of security that the polis itself indirectly provided the manumitted slaves.14 A 
mix of private citizens and officials, both sacred and secular, typically made up the witnesses, 
and a number of manumission agreements include a penalty, usually monetary, against the seller 
and guarantor should they not fulfill their duties in ensuring the security of the sale.15 This 
obligation to pay a financial penalty to the god Apollo invested the interest of the guarantor and 
the seller into the protection of the manumitted slave’s freedom and into upholding the terms of 
the agreement. Many inscriptions also bestow onto any bystanders the power to defend the 
freedperson’s freedom with impunity. This clause essentially provides a sense of protection over 
the manumitted slave’s freedom in perpetuity, granting anyone permission—and indeed, 
conferring a certain sense of responsibility—to come to the defense of a freedperson without any 
fear of legal or criminal consequence (which was especially important in the event that the 
manumittor or guarantor should die). Though not all of the inscriptions include all of these 
provisions, a substantial proportion of them provide at least some security against anyone 
challenging or threatening the freedom acquired through the manumission. Despite the 
“fictitious” nature of the transactions in the manumission epigraphy, the legal provisions and 
safeguards were entirely real. 
 Two thirds of the slaves named in the Delphic epigraphy did immediately receive the 
powers ποιεῖν ὅ κα θέληι, εἶµεν εἷ κα θέληι (“to do whatever he/she wishes and to live wherever 
he/she wishes”) with the accompanying protections from the moment of the payment.16 
However, about a third of the manumission cases at Delphi include a clause that required the 
slave to “remain” (παραµένειν) after the sale for a prescribed duration of time with the former 
                                               
14 For the interest of the city in manumissions, see Zelnick-Abramovitz, “Freed slaves, Their Status and State 
Control in Ancient Greece,” Revue Européenne d'Histoire 16 (2009): 303-318. 
15 Kamen (2014), 288-289. 
16 Hopkins, 140.  
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owner or other individual—hence the name for a contract of this kind, paramone (παραµονή). A 
typical paramone clause takes a form similar to that in a slave woman Philtate’s manumission: 
παραµεινάτω δὲ Φιλτάτη Εὐκλέᾳ τὸν τᾶς ζωᾶς χρόνον, πᾶν ποιοῦσα τὸ ἐπιτασόµενον 
ἀνενκλήτως. εἰ δὲ µὴ ποιέοι, ἐξουσίαν ἐχέτω ἐπιτειµέουσα Εὔκλεα τρόπῳ ᾧ κα θέλῃ.17 
 
Let Philtate remain beside Euklea as long as she lives, doing everything ordered 
irreproachably. If she should not do so, let Euklea have the power to punish her in 
whatever way she wishes.  
 
Though following a recognizable formula, the paramone arrangements themselves involved 
conditions of varying number and stringency. Generally, the paramone clause obligated the 
manumitted person to stay in the service of the master or the master’s family, and usually until 
the slave owner died (though some slave owners did set a specific number of years).18 Some 
contracts offered the manumitted slave the option to pay additional sums to shorten the period of 
continued service; there are indeed examples of such apolysis (“release”) inscriptions, which 
discharged the manumitted slave early from the paramone term.19 The large number of contracts 
involving paramone service suggests that manumission was often not a simple conversion in 
status, but could instead be a complicated and drawn-out process.  
 The collection of manumission epigraphy in the sanctuary to Apollo at Delphi contains 
these common features, which make the inscriptions similar to one another but which also make 
the group as a whole distinctive. However, such standard and formulaic features do not come 
close to illustrating the complexity and peculiarity of the Delphic fictive sales, which include 
hundreds of individualized stories with unique characters, backgrounds, and results.    
 
 
                                               
17 FD 3.3.300. 
18 Hopkins, 142. 
19 FD 3.3.398, 419; SGDI 2015, 1868. 
 May 2018, Final paper submitted for Wolf Humanities Center Undergraduate Research Fellowship 
Claudia Kassner, College of Arts and Sciences 2018, University of Pennsylvania  
7 
7 
Motivations for Manumission 
 Despite this apparent ability to enter into a contract with commitments and benefits, the 
slave was still originally the legal property of the slave owner, used as a tool in whatever way the 
owner decided. So why were these slaves in the Delphic inscriptions able to purchase release 
from enslavement? Selling the slave was fully in the slave owner’s right to do, and freeing the 
slave deprived the owner’s heirs of part of their inheritance. Moreover, freed slaves were not 
granted citizenship in Greece as in Rome, so there were none of the social or political benefits 
that came along with accumulating loyal clients.20 So why did Greek slave masters offer the 
option of freedom to their slaves, when they were under no obligation to do so? 
 For the unconditional and immediately effective manumissions, it seems likely that the 
slave owner used manumission to replace an older slave with a younger one at minimal cost. In 
other words, another slave owner would pay less money to purchase the older slave than would 
the slave himself or herself. Hamel’s interpretation of the manumission of Neaira, a slave-
prostitute in Athens, illustrates this opportunity. Neaira’s two male owners, when they wanted to 
get married, offered her freedom for two-thirds of the price they paid to own her, a gesture which 
Apollodoros (or Pseudo-Demosthenes) suggests is generosity as a result of affection for the 
slave-girl.21 Hamel, however, disagrees. She points out the difficulty that the two men would 
likely face in trying to sell a slave-girl of Neaira’s age, already older and “past her prime”—they 
might not even have received as much as the sale-price they extended to girl herself, at least 
without investing time (which they perhaps could not spare) into finding the right customers. 
“They were certain of getting their price, and they were spared the trouble of haggling,” Hamel 
                                               
20 Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005), 60. 
21 Dem. 59. 30 
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notes.22 Whatever the true intent of Neaira’s owners was, Hamel’s reasoning can easily apply to 
the Delphic manumissions. Zelnick-Abramovitz even calls it the “most obvious reason,” namely 
that the slave owners would want to rid themselves of an older and less sellable slave while at the 
same time acquiring the money to buy a younger and more vigorous replacement.23 Still, this is 
largely speculation, since there is no way to know the age of the manumitted slaves in the 
inscriptions, but the manumission prices in the inscriptions did correlate closely with the market-
price of a new slave (the average price range being three to five mnae).24 
 Manumissions with paramone, however, could actually yield a profit for the slave owner, 
even in excess of the manumitted slave’s original purchase price. In manumissions that obligated 
the slave to a period of paramone, the slave owner received both the money for purchasing 
another, younger slave, and also the continued service of the manumitted slave, often until the 
slave owner’s death. A common provision for paramone was that, during its extent, the 
manumitted slave ποιοῦντα πᾶν τὸ ἐπιτασσόµενον (“do everything that is ordered”), often 
accompanied with ἀνεγκλήτως (“irreproachably”) or πᾶν τὸ δυνατόν (“in every way possible”). 
Such conditions imply that the slaves in these documents were meant to keep working much as 
they did as slaves, compelled to follow every order of the masters’ to the best of their abilities. If 
the implication is not clear, some inscriptions are more explicit: in FD 3.3.337, three manumitted 
slave-girls agree to δουλεύοντα (“be slaves”) during the term of paramone, which is until the 
master dies. Similarly, in FD 3.6.51, Sotima and her son Polytimidas reserve the power, if the 
manumitted slaves do not follow orders, to ἐπιτιµέοντες ὡς δούλοις (“punish them as/as if 
                                               
22 Hamel, Trying Neaira: The True Story of A Courtesan’s Scandalous Life in Ancient Greece (New Haven & 
London: Yale University Press, 2003). 
23 Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005), 151.  
24 Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005), 155; Hopkins, 159-160. 
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slaves”). Such language raises the question: was the person who had paid for manumission, but 
obligated to serve a paramone term, really still a slave?  
 To approach this question, it is necessary first to examine the conceptual framework 
within which these manumission inscriptions were operating. The epigraphy presents a crucial 
liminal moment in the lives of those sold to Pythian Apollo, capturing the transition between 
slavery and freedom. The carved manumission contracts themselves not only effected this 
transition, but also preserved it—in the future, the manumitted slave could point to the 
inscription as evidence of his or her free status. The inscriptions therefore serve as a valuable 
source for examining how the ancient Greeks conceived of and put into practice ideas of freedom 
and personal liberty—what rights or qualities did those drawing up these contracts believe were 
part of a free man’s status, and what distinguished a freed slave from an ordinary slave? 
 In the inscriptions, Westermann highlights four elements that appear often as markers of 
freedom, distinguishing the freed slave from the pre-manumission slave:  
1. He is to be his own representative, his own master, in all legal matters, without need 
of intervention of a second party. This is the legal expression of freedom.  
2. He is not subject to seizure as property. Said otherwise: No one dares lay a hand upon 
him. 
3. He may do what he desires to do. 
4. He may go where he desires to go. Or, in a variant form, he may live where he desires 
to live.25 
 
Westermann is certainly correct that the Delphic sales often include these aspects of liberty to 
expound the manumitted slave’s new freed status. That no one may seize the manumitted slave 
as property is illustrated in the slave becoming ἀνέφαπτος (“untouchable”) through 
manumission—this sense of the word is confirmed by the commonly added provisions that 
anticipate the possibility that τις ἐφάπτοιτο…ἐπὶ καταδουλισσµῶι (“someone should lay hand on 
                                               
25 Westermann, “Slavery and Elements of Freedom in Ancient Greece,” in Slavery in Classical Antiquity, ed. Moses 
Finley (Cambridge: Heffer, 1968): 26. 
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[the manumitted slave] for the purpose of enslavement”). The conferral of freedom of action 
usually appears in the contracts as the manumitted slave ποιέουσα ὅ κα θέλη, and likewise the 
freedom of movement as ἀποτρέχουσα οἷς κα θέλη.26 These various personal freedoms can 
appear in any number or combination in the inscriptions, but all together they usually comprise 
the most detailed descriptions of the shift from slave to freedperson.  
 For the nearly three quarters of the inscriptions which bestow immediate and 
unadulterated freedom, there is not much that is vague in the manumitted slave’s status; he or she 
is now a free person, free to do whatever, to go wherever, and to not be enslaved. However, 
contracts that include paramone agreements have incited much debate and confusion in 
scholarship regarding the question of servile status, particularly because in such cases the slave 
continues serving the master after the time of the manumission contract. The convention is to 
label the state of the person serving in paramone “conditional freedom” since the contract 
attaches certain obligations to the enslaved party.27 This term, however, is ambiguous. When 
they employ it, the scholars tend to treat it as a paradoxical state of freedom, whereby there are 
conditions placed upon the activities of the freed person: Kamen describes those obligated to 
paramone as “slaves freed with strings attached.”28 The confusion arising from this 
understanding of “conditional freedom,” in conjunction with how harsh these “strings” were in 
paramone, is reflected in its treatment in scholarship. Westermann asserts, “To the Greek mind, 
freedom was not a unit but something divisible,”29 and explains that those bound to paramone 
terms were legally free, but not necessarily free in respect to the other elements of freedom that 
                                               
26 For examples in which all of these elements are included (often in the same sentence), see SGDI 1686, 1724, 
1727,1728, 1733.  
27 Kamen, Status in Classical Athens (Princeton: University Press, 2013), 34; Tucker, “Women in the Manumission 
Inscriptions at Delphi,” Transactions of the American Philological Association 112 (1982): 226; Hopkins, 141; 
Finley (1968), 55.  
28 Kamen (2013), 30.  
29 Westermann (1968), 27. 
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he identified.30 In short, he affirms of the Greeks, “Theirs was a society in which a man could be 
part free and part slave, ἡµίδουλος.”31 Similarly, Kamen describes conditionally freed slaves as 
being “neither free nor slave, but in some ways both,”32 Zelnick-Abramovitz speaks of them as 
occupying a position of “semi-slavery, or half way between slavery and freedom,”33 and 
Sokolowski refers to “the half freedman in paramone.”34 Despite his many disagreements with 
Westermann, Finley too observes the phenomenon that “a man who has been a slave is freed, but 
his freedom is partly withdrawn in the same action in which it is given to him,”35 leaving the 
man with only partial freedom; he puts the conditionally freed slave on the “spectrum of 
statuses” between slave, freedman, and free citizen.36 Despite this apparent consensus, scholarly 
opinion on the status of slaves during periods of paramone seems rather steeped in uncertainty, 
settling only on an agreement on the ambiguity of the status. 
 The general assumption, then, appears to be that the master freed the slave upon the sale 
recorded in the manumission inscriptions, and that the manumitted slave performed the 
paramone as a freedperson—thus the slave’s precarious state of liberation. Westermann says as 
much explicitly: “paramone was not just a deferral of manumission, but rather a new status for 
the slave as a freedman with certain obligations and duties.”37 As mentioned above, scholars 
therefore usually treat the “conditional” part of “conditional freedom” as shaping the life of the 
freedman or freedwoman following liberation, as conditions under which the freedperson could 
be free (at least until the owner dies). However, conditions of this kind exist in the inscriptions 
outside of paramone clauses, and these are typically not included in the category of “conditional 
                                               
30 Westermann, 28-29. 
31 Ibid. Westermann invents this term—it does not appear anywhere in the epigraphy.  
32 Kamen (2013), 37. 
33 Zelnick-Abramovitz, (2005), 339. 
34 Sokolowski, “The Real Meaning of Sacral Manumission,” The Harvard Theological Review 47 (1954): 174. 
35 Finley, “Servile Statuses of Ancient Greece,” Revue Internationale des Droits de L'antiquité 7 (1954): 182. 
36 Finley, (1968): 55.  
37 Westermann, “Paramone as a General Service Contract,” Journal of Juristic Papyrology 2 (1948): 16.  
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freedom” (which usually exclusively refers to paramone cases). For example, in SGDI 1718, 
Epicharidas prohibits the manumitted slave Asia from living outside Lileia (where he resides), 
and in FD 3.3.26, Lais’ manumittors dictate that she cannot “speak badly” of them.38 In neither 
of these cases are the manumitted slaves obligated to paramone, and in both these cases the 
manumittors lay out the conditions that are specific to their transaction. In just the sheer number 
of paramone contracts (four hundred),39 Westermann therefore seems correct in arguing that 
paramone prescribed a distinct status for the slave that could be encapsulated in the recognizable 
and much-used term παραµεινάτω (“let him/her remain beside”). However, when contrasted with 
these more straightforward examples of rule-based freedom, could the sense of “conditional 
freedom” in the case of paramone be instead that there were conditions upon the completion of 
which the freedperson was manumitted? In other words, was the agreement of paramone instead 
that the slave would acquire freedom after fulfilling the conditions? 
 It is worthwhile to examine to what extent the elements of freedom identified by 
Westermann are applicable to the situation of the person under paramone obligations. In terms of 
the virtually always-present statement that the slave in the manumission contract ἐλευθέρα εἶµεν, 
Sosin points out that the infinitive “to be” in the Delphic inscriptions “referred to something that 
‘is to’ come about,” a “prospective, future sense of the infinitive” that appears in many legal 
contexts.40 As an example, he calls attention to the language of a contract for a fourth century 
lease, which indicates that a number of individuals κατὰ τάδε ἐµίσθωσαν (“let [several buildings] 
on the following conditions”), ἐφ’ ὧιτε διδόναι (“according to which [the lessee] pay”) the rent 
in two installments.41 The present infinitive “to be” in the Delphic inscriptions almost always 
                                               
38 “µὴ εἰπά[τ]ω δὲ Λαῒς κακῶς µήτε Μενὼ µήτε Καλλίαν.” 
39 Hopkins, 140. 
40 Sosin, “Manumission with Paramone: Conditional Freedom?”, TAPA 145 (2015): 329-330. 
41 IG II2 2496 
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follows ἐφ’ ὧιτε just as διδόναι does here, and just as διδόναι is a present infinitive indicating 
future action, so too could be the role of εἶµεν in the manumission contracts. It is not, Sosin 
asserts, “effecting, or even recognizing existing liberty,” as many scholars often misconstrue it to 
do.42 There are even some inscriptions that make clear that the manumission follows the 
completion of paramone service: for example, SGDI 1703 dictates, εἴ κα παραµείνη, καθὼς 
γέγραπται, βέβαιος ἔσ[τ]ω ἁ ὠνὰ τῶι θεῶι (“if [the slave] remains beside, accordingly as has 
been written, let the sale be guaranteed to the god”).43 It is impossible to know whether these 
cases are special or simply articulate what is implicit in most. If, however, Sosin is correct and 
the act of manumission does not necessarily occur at the moment of the monetary transaction, 
there is little to suggest that the people serving under paramone have any share of freedom yet.  
 The description of the freedperson’s status as ἀνέφαπτος best illustrates the contradictions 
within the Delphic sales if the slave in paramone is, in fact, free, as many scholars take for 
granted. Considering one sense of “untouchable”  being “not subject to enslavement”, there are 
multiple examples of inscriptions that allow the manumittor to render the contract void and 
thereby return the “manumitted” slave to slavery before the completion of the paramone term 
(usually as a result of the slave not satisfactorily performing the services in paramone).44 In these 
cases, the “manumitted” individual could easily fall right back into enslavement—there is little 
authority or protection in his new status. Furthermore, being “untouchable” could also refer to 
the use of physical force that was characteristic of slavery. Demosthenes comments:  
If, gentlemen of the jury, you will turn over in your minds the question what is the 
difference between being a slave and being a free man, you will find that the biggest 
difference is that the body of a slave is made responsible for all his misdeeds, whereas 
corporal punishment is the last penalty to inflict on a free man.45  
                                               
42 Sosin, 329-330. 
43 See also SGDI 1704.  
44 See SGDI 1819, 1944; FD 3.3.6. 
45 Dem. 24.167, trans. A.T. Murray (East Sussex, Delphi Publishing Ltd: 2015). See also Dem. 22.55. 
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Slaves could, and often did, suffer physical and violent punishment at the hands of their masters, 
something that distinguished them from free men and which Demosthenes even considers as 
being a defining quality of slavery. Certainly those serving paramone terms were subject to 
physical punishment at the will of the slave owner; frequently the master was allowed ἐπιτειµέων 
τρόπῳ ᾧ κα θέλῃ (“to punish [the slave] in whatever way he/she wishes”) if the slave did not 
perform as promised or desired.46 This is despite the fact that, in many cases, the same 
inscriptions say that the slave is to be free and untouchable ἀπὸ πάντων τὸν πάντα βίον (“by all 
for the rest of his/her life”) or sometimes τὸν πάντα χρόνον (“for all time”).47 It seems like quite a 
contradiction for a contract to protect the freed slave from physical harm or re-enslavement by 
anyone for the rest of his or her life (such privileges as come with freedom), and a few lines later 
to bestow unto the slave owner the power to physically harm or re-enslave this same freedperson. 
This apparent inconsistency can be reconciled if the slave is not actually manumitted until after 
the period of paramone.  
 Returning back to the sometimes explicit obligation of slaves in these contracts to serve 
their masters δουλεύοντες (“being slaves”) and so on,48 such language eliminates the last two 
elements of freedom outlined by Westermann: the ability to do or go wherever one wishes, or 
freedom of action and of movement respectively. The person in paramone certainly cannot go 
wherever he or she pleases, since he or she needs to be near the slave owner in order to execute 
πᾶν τὸ ἐπιτασσόµενον ἀνεγκλήτως or πᾶν τὸ δυνατόν—and this of course means the same person 
does not have the freedom to do whatever he or she pleases either (especially with the threat of 
violent punishment or nullification of the contract). If, then, the only qualities distinguishing a 
                                               
46 FD 3.3.329, 332, etc. 
47 See FD 3.3.318. 
48 FD 3.3.329, 337; 3.2.129; 2.3.337; SGDI 2072, 2092, as some examples. 
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slave from a freed slave are these elements of freedom illustrated in the Delphic sales themselves 
and enumerated by Westermann (for most freed slaves most likely did not receive citizenship),49 
and the slaves under paramone evidently enjoyed none of these personal freedoms, then were 
they not just still slaves? 
 It appears likely that those who were conditionally manumitted (however one may define 
it) were what Kamen calls “privileged slaves,” who had more autonomy than the average chattel 
slave over their movement and who had the potential to make money.50 By this definition, they 
would have been privileged even before the composition of the manumission contract, but the 
inscribed legal promise of future manumission surely heightened this privilege. It may be more 
accurate, then, to consider the inscriptions including paramone clauses as being “pre-contracts,” 
written commitments to a legally clear process that will result in the slaves’ freedom, but not 
grant it immediately. Yet even if scholarly consensus is correct about a free-servile gray area 
created by paramone agreements, nonetheless it is worth noting that the “freed” slaves under 
paramone resembled average slaves a great deal, and that the dynamic between manumitted and 
manumittor during paramone periods resembled the previous and more straightforward slave-
master relationship a great deal. Therefore, in sum, from paramone agreements, manumittors 
benefitted by obtaining the monetary sums to replace a slave who essentially still continued his 
or her servile labor in the same manner as before.  
 There were other ways the slave owner could benefit from the manumissions with 
paramone attached. If a slave wanted early release from the agreed term of extended service, 
often he or she would pay an additional sum for apolysis, which was no small fraction of the 
                                               
49 Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005), 60. 
50 Kamen (2013), 24-27. 
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original manumission cost.51 Moreover, there are multiple examples of contracts that stipulate 
that the property of a freed slave, upon his or her death, go to the manumittor or the 
manumittor’s family.52 Such inheritances could have been a way to make up for the assets lost by 
the manumittor’s heirs as a result of the manumission; whatever the financial loss involved in the 
relinquishment of a slave, it was reabsorbed when the yields of his or her labor in freedom 
returned back into the manumittor’s family. The slave owner demanding paramone could 
therefore make money both directly from the price of manumission (with no loss in labor for, in 
most cases, the rest of the owner’s life) and from other payments after the inscribing of the 
manumission contract.  
 The assumption is, of course, that the sums passing between the hands of the slave and 
the master were compensatory for the monetary loss of the slave’s service and meant to go 
toward the acquisition of a new slave. One example illustrates this mna-to-person relationship: in 
SGDI 1717, Aphrodisia  agrees to remain with her manumittors until they die, and thereupon to 
buy her freedom from their son for one mna. However, she can achieve early release from her 
paramone by purchasing a female slave (of the same age) who would take her place. Tucker 
indicates a particularly interesting element of this agreement: should she attain her apolysis, upon 
the death of her manumittors Aphrodisia has to give their son either the aforementioned one mna, 
or the female slave who served in her stead.53 The new female slave would therefore still belong 
to Aphrodisia during the paramone term, and would quite literally be standing in for Aphrodisia 
and serving the term for her.  
  
                                               
51 SGDI 1717, 1811. 
52 See SGDI 1891, 2097, 2202. 
53 Tucker, “Women in the Manumission Inscriptions at Delphi,” Transactions of the American Philological 
Association 112 (1982): 234.  
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 Such arrangements cast even more skepticism over the status of a manumitted slave’s 
“freedom” under paramone. Aphrodisia could purchase a slave, but for a number of women, 
even the human life they created while “remaining beside” their former masters did not belong to 
them. These cases provide an especially disheartening view into the dehumanizing business of 
slavery, whereby slave owners used the reproductive potential of female slaves to capitalize on 
manumission. At least thirteen of the inscriptions require slave-women in paramone to supply 
one or more children for enslavement to the manumittor’s family, usually to his children.54  
Occasionally, owners also retained the right to keep children born from a woman in paramone as 
slaves or to sell them as they wish. As an example, in FD 3.6.39, Aristion and Eisias state that 
children born to Sostrata during her time in paramone would be free, ἐκτὸς ἐὰν µή τι θέλωντι 
Ἀριστίων καὶ Εἰσιὰς πωλῆσαι πρὸς ἔνδειαν (“except if Aristion and Eisias wish to sell them in the 
face of need”).55 Most commonly, though, the arrangement entailed the female slave paying the 
price of manumission, serving her master until his or her death, and giving a baby or babies to 
the manumittor’s heir. For her manumission, Sotericha (FD 3.3.273) pays the initial 
manumission fee, submits to a term of paramone in the service of her manumittors, agrees to 
provide children for her manumittors, and is given an additional price to pay for apolysis if she 
wants to be released early.56  These instances are particularly disturbing illustrations of how far 
the objectification of these slaves, and slave children, could go on both sides of the transaction—
and how slavery could rend families apart. “Parents left children behind in slavery to win 
freedom for themselves as adults,” observes Hopkins.57 Through conditional manumission, slave 
owners could get multiple slaves out of a single slave; whether by the mnae the freed slave gave 
                                               
54 Hopkins, 156.  
55 See also FD 3.3.306. 
56 See also FD 3.3.291, 332, 3.6.22, 39, 43, 57. 
57 Hopkins, 166. 
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or by the slave’s own flesh and blood—or in many cases both—the manumission of one slave 
could more than make up for itself with respect to the master’s slave supply.  
 Not even should apparent parentage in the inscriptions necessarily suggest fondness or 
kindness as primary motivations for the manumittors. Some manumittors could indeed have been 
the fathers of the slave children mentioned, and some inscriptions suggest this relationship more 
than others. One such case is that of Agamestor, son of Telestas; he manumitted Zopyra and her 
two children, σώµατα ἀνδρεῖα δύο οἷς ὀνόµατα Ἀγαµήστωρ, Τελέστας, τὸ γένος οἰκογενεῖς (“two 
male bodies named Agamestor [and] Telestas, home-born in origin”).58 In addition to her 
children—both born in the home—sharing the names of the slave owner and of his father, 
Zopyra and her sons were to remain with Agamestor for the rest of his life. These pieces together 
make the parties in this inscription look like something of a family unit. In another similar case, 
Kleomantis manumits Eisias in standard fashion, committing her to paramone and even 
clarifying his power to punish her however he wishes should she not hold up her end of the 
agreement.59 However, Eisias’ apolysis appears later in FD 3.3.333, as well as that of τὸν 
γεγενηµένον ἐν τᾷ παραµονᾷ ἐξ αὐτᾶς υἱὸν Νικόστρατον, ὃν καὶ µετωνόµασα θέσει Κλεόµαντιν 
(“her son Nikostratos born from her in paramone, whom also [Kleomantis] has changed the 
name to Kleomantis”). Kleomantis then names Eisias and her son as his heirs, after his wife. 
Between the written manumission of Eisias and her apolysis, she may have borne a child by 
Kleomantis, as illustrated in her new inheritance and in the change of her son’s name.60 
However, seeing as Eisias and her son become his beneficiaries, it seems probable that 
Kleomantis has no other offspring to whom he can pass on his legacy. The biological truth of 
                                               
58 SGDI 1715. 
59 FD 3.3.329. 
60 Tucker, 230-231. 
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nominally paternal inscriptions like these61 is difficult to ascertain, but both the cases of 
Agamestor and Kleomantis demonstrate how a slave owner—presumably one without free or 
“legitimate” offspring—could turn to manumission in order to secure his family name and 
property, or perhaps to ensure the arrangement of his funeral rites, as a number of inscriptions 
also require of the manumitted slave.62 
 It appears best, in general, to avoid assuming that these manumittors offered freedom to 
their slaves purely out of generosity or affection. There could always be the exceptional cases, 
but financially slave owners stood to gain a great deal from offering their slaves the prospective 
of freedom, especially through a paramone arrangement. Hopkins points out the irony that lies at 
the heart of this kind of manumission. “The legal force of contract was being used to get ex-
slaves to agree to their own exploitation,”63 he remarks, then continues later: “Manumission and 
the slave market grew hand in hand.”64 The types of manumission arrangements preserved in the 
Delphic epigraphy made the slave complicit in the slave system; the money one slave paid to 
grasp freedom went toward the continued enslavement of another. This cycle is all the more 
apparent when the slaves and slave owners use human lives as bargaining chips in these 
manumission transactions. 
 
Purchasing Manumission 
 One of the most fundamental aspects of Delphic manumission was the payment of money 
by the slave to the slave owner.65 In the whole collection of inscriptions, there are only two cases 
in which the manumittors give freedom (though with paramone) to slaves δωρέαν (“as a gift”)—
                                               
61 See also SGDI 2144, FD 3.6.125, FD 3.3.287, FD 3.3.372. 
62 See FD 3.2.243; 3.3.24, 269, 364; 3.6.40. 
63 Hopkins, 154.  
64 Hopkins, 170. 
65 Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005), 208. 
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in other words, free of charge.66 But how did slaves, a group of people who by definition did not 
perform labor for compensation, and especially in a society where slaves had, in theory, no legal 
rights over property,67 possibly raise this money with which they could purchase their freedom? 
And why would masters allow their slaves to keep this money at all, when they could claim all of 
it for themselves?  
 Regarding the specific occupations that provided the slaves in the Delphic inscriptions 
the means to save up the cost of manumission, the epigraphy does not offer much information. In 
the whole collection, a tiny number (less than a dozen) of the inscriptions include the specific 
trade of the slave, and even then the texts can be vague,68 such as when the slave women are 
simply referred to as τέχνιτις (“skilled woman”, or “craftswoman”).69 There are, however, two 
inscriptions that include flute-playing slaves,70 and two that include seamstresses.71 In FD 
3.1.565—the only inscription that names a male slave’s craft—the manumitted man is a bronze 
worker (τεχνείταν χαλκῆ).72 But the small size of this sample, of course, does not mean that the 
slaves who are not explicitly associated with a skill were unskilled. Tucker guesses that 
inscriptions may have included the slave’s occupation as an explanation for a particularly high 
manumission price,73 but the seamstresses in FD 3.2.230 and 3.3.26 purchased their freedom for 
five mnae and four mnae, 30 staters respectively, a perfectly average cost for manumission in the 
                                               
66 See FD 3.3.364, 45. 
67 Kamen (2013), 20. 
68 Hopkins, 168; Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005), 181.  
69 See SGDI 2154 and 2177.  
70 SGDI 1842 (“τεχνῆτιν αὐλητρίδα”) and FD 3.3.54 (“τεχνίτιδα αὐλῆτριν”). 
71 FD 3.2.230 and 3.3.26: “τεχνῖτιν ῥαφίδηαν.” 
72 Kamen identifies the slaves in three more inscriptions as prostitutes, but her reasoning is a bit tenuous and rests on 
the multiple meanings and forms of  “ἐργάζοµαι”; though the verb is a popular euphemism for sexual work, another 
inscription in the collection nonetheless uses this verb with the literal meaning of “to work” (specifying the work as 
fullery, SGDI 1904), meaning that the word’s use in the inscriptions she discusses could well be the same. Kamen 
may be correct, but the verb alone is insufficient evidence for drawing any definite conclusions about the presence 
of prostitutes in the epigraphic collection. Kamen, “Slave-Prostitutes and ΕΡΓΑΣΙΑ in the Delphic Manumission 
Inscriptions,” Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 188 (2014): 149–153.   
73 Tucker, 226.  
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Delphic data. Likewise, within this small sample of inscriptions, the race or origin of the slave 
seems to have little correlation with the slave’s occupation.74 All in all, there seems to be little 
significance in whether or not a manumission inscription included the particular kind of work in 
which the manumitted slave was engaged. Just as with the mention of the slave’s birth, the 
mention of the occupation was likely a discretionary addition to the manumission contract for a 
more detailed identification of the manumitted slave, perhaps if the slave planned on continuing 
in this occupation in his or her freedom. Surely the more explicit the description of the 
manumitted slave was, the better the inscription served as evidence in the event that the 
freedperson had to prove his or her free status (and the slave owner may simply not have wanted 
to pay to inscribe anything that was not imperative to include).75 
 The Delphic inscriptions themselves therefore do not supply much material for 
understanding the range of jobs in which the manumitted slaves were previously employed. This 
relative silence presents a conundrum of a clear possession of money by the slaves manumitted 
in Delphi (for that it was they who paid the manumission price instead of, ostensibly, the god 
Apollo, the overwhelming majority of the inscriptions communicate with the statement that the 
slave “entrusted the sale to the god”) and little to no evidence from the epigraphy or Delphi as to 
how they possibly acquired these sums. Most evidence of slaves’ accumulation of money comes 
from Athens, particularly because of the city’s judicial system and the court speeches that have 
survived. The extent to which Attic evidence can speak to Delphic practice is, of course, limited 
and can only be speculative, but it provides some mode of addressing this conundrum—and 
                                               
74 One seamstress is τὸ γένος οἰκογενῆ (“home-born in origin”) while the other is τὸ γένος Θρονιάδα (“from 
Thronium in origin”). One τεχνῖτιν is τὸ γένος Γαλάτισσαν (“Galatian in origin”) while another is τὸ γένος ἐνδογενῆ 
(“born-within in origin”). There does not appear to be any indication that skilled slaves tended generally to be either 
of foreign extraction or born within the home. 
75 Westermann (1946), footnote 2.  
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especially because there are indications that a paramone-like procedure existed in Athens,76 there 
is reason to suppose that the two regions had similarities in their slave systems.  
 The means by which a slave could receive and save up money seems chiefly to be found 
in the multiple mentions of an ἀποφορά (“apophora”), a payment that slaves regularly made to 
their masters.77 Aeschines in Against Timarchus provides the most detail about the nature of 
these payments: he says that Timarchus had “nine or ten slaves who were skilled shoemakers, 
each of whom paid him a fee (ἀποφορὰν ἔφερε) of two obols a day.”78 The term itself lends some 
information: the prefix ἀπο suggests that money came “from” the slave, meaning that the slave 
possessed some means from which he or she could pay the sum79 (Kazakévich illustrates the 
clear distinction between a slave supplying an apophora and a slave who was µισθοφορῶν, 
“misthos-bearing” or “rent-bearing,” who handed over to the slave owner the money which a 
third party provided for the slave’s services).80 Excluding, then, the pay from hired-out service to 
another individual, a likely source of this apophora money was profit derived from the 
manufacturing and sale of goods. These skilled slaves sometimes received a “slave-allowance,”81 
a fraction of their earnings which they were allowed to keep: the Old Oligarch confirms that the 
apophora which such slaves gave to their owners was only a portion of what they earned in their 
work.82 Especially if, as in Timarchus’ case, the monetary obligation of these slaves to their 
owners was a fixed price, Kamen logically assumes that the slaves were typically permitted to 
keep whatever earnings remained after the apophora and use them as they wished83—including 
                                               
76 See Westermann, “Two Studies in Athenian Manumission,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 5 (1946): 92-104. 
77 W. Schmitz, “Apophora,” in H. Cancik et al. (eds.), Brill’s New Pauly: Encyclopaedia of the Ancient World 
(Leiden 2002): 885–86. 
78 Aeschin. 1.97; Thphr. Char. 30.15. 
79 Kazakévich, “Were the χωρὶς οἰκοῦντες Slaves?,” ed. D. Kamen, GRBS 48 (2008 [1960]) 354-355. 
80 Kazakévich, 347-377. 
81 Kamen (2016), 413. 
82 Ps.-Xen. Ath.Pol. 1.11. 
83 Ibid.   
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saving them up to buy freedom. Acton concurs, and remarks “being able to keep profits after the 
apophora was best of all, especially as it offered the prospect of manumission,”84 and Kamen 
adds that slaves who had this chance at purchasing freedom were distinctly “privileged” relative 
to the largely wage-less slave population.85  
 Kamen also calculates the kind of time frame that saving up for manumission could 
entail: using the shoemaking slaves of Timarchus as an example, she concludes that, with a 
savings rate of one obol a day, it would have taken at least five to eight years for a slave to raise 
the money for manumission.86 Even if saving one obol a day is perhaps unrealistic, this is not a 
particularly long amount of time—for example, if a young slave girl started working and saving 
in her early adolescence, she could theoretically buy her freedom in her early adulthood (which 
may perhaps help explain the multiple Delphic manumission contracts which require, and 
therefore assume feasible, that manumitted women bear children for the manumittors). However, 
how the practice of apophora worked is still obscure in the details, for although Timarchus’ 
system appears to be a fixed price paid daily, other examples indicate that longer distances 
sometimes existed between slave and slave master which would have made daily payments 
unlikely. Each arrangement probably differed from case to case,  as probably did the rate a slave 
saved up money.87  
 Many scholars assume that the apophora came from slaves who were “living apart” from 
their masters, running factories or workshops outside the master’s home on the master’s behalf.88 
                                               
84 Acton, Poiesis: Manufacturing in Classical Athens (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 285.  
85 Kamen (2013), 29.  
86 Kamen (2016), 416-417. 
87 See Andoc. 1.38., Men. Epitr. 378-380, 
88 Kazakévich argues quite convincingly that these slaves were not part of the χωρὶς οἰκοῦντες category to which 
many scholars erroneously assign them: see Kazakévich (1960). For an explanation as to why scholarship has been 
mistaken for so long regarding this label and another investigation into the identities of the χωρὶς οἰκοῦντες, see 
Lewis, “Khoris Oikountes and the Obligations of Freedmen in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Athens,” 
Incidenza dell’ antico 12 (2014): 91-113. 
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There were indeed slaves who conducted businesses in a semiautonomous manner at a distance 
from their masters,89 and there were a number of advantages for the slave owner who granted 
this kind of independence to a slave. By having slaves work in (as well as, often, manage)90 these 
satellite businesses, the slave owner essentially made a low-risk, low-maintenance investment 
that yielded steady profits. The slave owners could leave much of the business management to 
the slaves and simply reap the benefits of his or her slaves’ industry. Though with a fixed 
apophora the slave could consequently lose money when the business suffered, he or she also 
stood to make a great deal of money when it succeeded. “The risk and the profit of the business 
belonged to the foreman,” Acton observes.91 The slaves worried about the daily operation of the 
business, and they provided the owner a constant stream of money.   
 However, these slaves working outside their master’s households cannot account entirely 
for the large quantity of slaves in the Delphic epigraphy. For one thing, the majority of the slaves 
in the inscriptions are female.92 Though there are examples of women working in or even 
running separate businesses and workshops,93 the overall relegation of women in Greece to the 
household usually set the female slaves over domestic services. Therefore, if the slave owner 
were to set up satellite businesses, he or she would probably not send out the female slaves to run 
them. Furthermore, seeing as there are hundreds of slaves whose manumissions are recorded in 
the inscriptions, this would be an astounding number of privately owned slaves to work outside 
the home. Hopkins additionally deduces from the Delphic manumission data that the masters 
generally did not own large numbers of slaves,94 and so they would probably not have invested 
                                               
89 Kamen (2013), 24. 
90 Acton, 286: “A slave workforce managed by slaves or recently freed men was the normal system for dedicated 
workshops.” 
91 Acton, 286. 
92 61%; Hopkins, 140. 
93 Brock, “The Labor of Women in Classical Athens,” The Classical Quarterly 44 (1994): 342. 
94 Hopkins, 169.  
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their limited slave labor into enterprises not directly linked with the running of their household. It 
seems more likely, therefore, that a large proportion of the slaves in the manumission 
inscriptions worked within the owner’s οἶκος, and that “privileged” slave status was not limited 
to those who worked outside the owner’s supervision.  
 How did slaves earn money for manumission—as those who ran separate businesses 
could do—from the οἶκος? Certain archaeological investigations suggest that some households in 
ancient Greece had workshops incorporated into them, even manufacturing on a large scale. 
Cahill comes to this conclusion in his discussion of the site of Olynthus and the wealth of 
archaeological evidence on Greek households that it contains.95 From his examination of this 
excavated city and its homes, Cahill makes the following determinations: first, that household 
industry—by which he means “the production or processing of goods for sale or consumption 
outside the household” rather than production geared just toward the needs of the household 
itself96—was not at all uncommon. Second, that the industry was not “geographically marginal”:  
the houses that engaged in this kind of production were centrally located within the city and well 
dispersed throughout it. Lastly, household industry was not even marginal within the house itself, 
but rather it was “closely integrated with other household activities” and located in the heart of 
the οἶκος, off the courtyard and adjoining rooms, and sometimes opening out onto the street (and 
so giving the appearance of a shop). After noting that the homeowners could easily have 
sequestered the workshops from the rest of the household activity, Cahill concludes, “the degree 
of integration of domestic industry into the rest of the household is striking.”97 Ault comes to the 
same conclusions, saying that the Greek household was oriented “towards market exchange” and 
                                               
95 Cahill, “Household Industry in Greece and Anatolia,” in Ancient Greek Houses and Households: Chronological, 
Regional, and Social Diversity, eds. Bradley A. Ault and Lisa C. Nevett (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2005) 54-55.  
96 Ibid.  
97 Cahill, 59-60. 
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“not merely subsistence, but surplus production.”98 Included among the archaeologically attested 
types of work within the household are large-scale weaving, stonemasonry, sculpting, cobbling, 
metalwork, and baking.99  
 Cahill and Ault both regard this evidence as at odds with the general disdain toward 
banausic, technical work conveyed in the ancient sources,100 signaling a divide between ideology 
and reality—Greeks may have looked down on craftsmanship and commerce in principle, but 
they still engaged in them and reaped their rewards. The presence and centrality of such 
production within Greek households does suggest that the condemnation of artisan activities was 
probably stronger in speech than in practice, and perhaps was an attitude primarily belonging to 
the elite. However, a passage from Xenophon’s Memorabilia may reconcile this seeming 
inconsistency: when Aristarchus laments to Socrates that he cannot afford to feed all the people 
in his house now that a number of female relatives have moved in, Socrates asks why another 
man, Ceramon, is able to feed the same number of mouths while also making a profit. 
Aristarchus responds, “The explanation, of course, is this: my dependents are gentlefolk, his are 
slaves.” When Socrates suggests he put the free members of his household to work, Aristarchus 
continues to insist that although his female relatives know how to do tasks like weaving and 
baking, such jobs are unsuitable for free women.101 As with many of the arguments presented by 
Socrates’ interlocutors, Aristarchus’ reasoning represents a generally held assumption, in this 
case that household industry, like the production of textiles and food, is the job of slaves, and 
only in times of exceptional need did the free participate in it (even this latter condition is a 
                                               
98 Ault, “Oikos and Oikonomia: Greek houses, households and the domestic economy,” British School at Athens 
Studies 15 (2007): 259-263.  
99 Ault, 263; Cahill, 58-59. 
100 Ibid. For ancient sources, see Plat. Rep. 493d-e, 522b, 590c; Xen. Oik. 4.2-3; Arist. Pol. 1278a.  
101 Xen. Mem. 2.7, trans. William Heinemann, Xenophon in Seven Volumes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1923). 
 May 2018, Final paper submitted for Wolf Humanities Center Undergraduate Research Fellowship 
Claudia Kassner, College of Arts and Sciences 2018, University of Pennsylvania  
27 
27 
concession Socrates has to force from Aristarchus). Here, then, is a likely source of the 
manumission payment for those slaves who lived within the owner’s home. Whether in a 
household workshop of larger scale or simply through a surplus of goods that were part of the 
ordinary production of the οἶκος, both male and female skilled slaves could have the opportunity 
to manufacture goods for sale and generate income.102 The apophora system, and the potential 
for monetary gain that it offered slaves, was thus not restricted to those who worked outside the 
home.  
 A slave “privileged” by Kamen’s definition could therefore still live within the slave 
owner’s domicile, and probably did more often than not. The skilled slave in the home would not 
have the greater degree of freedom and autonomy that slaves further away enjoyed, but there 
were many other aspects of his or her position that contributed to a relatively privileged status. 
For one thing, skilled slaves making products for the household could stand to make money by 
creating a surplus of their product for outside sale, especially if their skill was unique and refined 
enough that their goods and, consequently, the slaves themselves became special (though, 
admittedly, this could raise the manumission price proportionally to the slave’s perceived 
value—some slaves explicitly regarded as “skilled” in the inscriptions had to pay as much as 
eleven or fifteen mnae).103 An agricultural slave’s production of surplus product probably did not 
so directly contribute to profits that the slave would derive wages from them, and there was 
perhaps also less room for distinction in agricultural labor. Furthermore, the centrality of 
workshops and other places of production within the home, and their integration with the other 
household activities (which Cahill so thoroughly emphasized), would make it more possible for 
slaves to interact with their owners’ families and forge familiar, and even close, relationships 
                                               
102 For women’s ability to generate income and their methods of doing so, see Brock (1994). 
103 SGDI 2177 and FD 3.1.565, respectively. 
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with them. Though the nearly always-present payment by the slave for manumission suggests 
that affection between slave and master was not usually sufficient to result in the slave’s 
liberation, fondness for the slave could certainly have led the master to lower the manumission 
price, not require a paramone term, impose lighter contractual obligations, or even just be open 
to the slave purchasing his or her freedom. In light of these advantages, it is not surprising that 
not one of the occupations specified in the manumission inscriptions refers to agricultural work, 
and it would probably not be erroneous to assume that the larger proportion of the slaves in the 
Delphic manumission epigraphy were skilled, and not agrarian, workers.  
 Still, such benefits for the skilled slaves were a result of, and secondary to, the benefits 
that such slave-driven household industry offered the slave owners. The profitable advantages of 
production within the home were similar to those of the distant slave-run workshops, except in 
the former case the slave owners could maintain supervision and tighter control over the slave 
workers. Furthermore, by incentivizing the slaves to increase their productive output with the 
promise of a piece of the sale earnings and, consequently, manumission, the slave owners were 
“exploiting their domestic activities for profit,” as Brock puts it.104 Production of textiles, food, 
and other staples was necessary to the functioning and self-sufficiency of the οἶκος, and so 
people (usually slaves) would be engaged in the creation of these household goods anyway. The 
apophora system could enable the slave owners to effectively extend their normal productive 
domestic activity into the commercial sphere, to actually—as Socrates mentions Ceramon doing 
in Xenophon’s Memorabilia—make a profit while performing the ordinary maintenance of his or 
her οἶκος. At once the needs of the slave owner’s family and dependents were being provided for 
and the slave owner was generating income.    
                                               
104 Brock, 340.  
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 Presumably a sizable percentage of the money that the slave owner allowed the skilled 
slave to keep ended up in the slave owner’s own pocket when the slave handed over his or her 
savings for manumission. So, however positive an outlook one might take on the masters 
bestowing onto their slaves higher degrees of autonomy and the means toward attaining 
freedom—this “privileged” (a term which must always be considered relative to the situations of 
other Greek slaves) status—they probably granted such privileges for self-serving purposes. In 
addition to fostering good will and trust between slave and master (and therefore ensuring the 
cooperation of the slave, to a certain degree), the slave owner also was able to guarantee revenue. 
He or she could profit twice, once on a daily basis from the slave’s income generating labor, and 
then again upon the slave’s manumission. Manumission in some sense was the element driving 
this boosted exploitation forward. It provided the incentive for the slaves’ participation, while 
also supplying a way for the system to replenish itself with younger slaves and so to continue as 
an almost self-sustaining organism.  
 
From Property to Personhood 
 Another of the most characteristic elements of Delphic manumission is the recorded 
purchase of slaves by the god Apollo, typically κατὰ τοὺς νόµους τᾶς πόλιος (“in accordance with 
the laws of the city”). The coexistence of legal procedure and religion is nothing extraordinary in 
ancient Greece, where there was no distinct separation between “church” and “state”105: for 
example, oaths to the gods could be used in legally binding agreements, and state assemblies 
                                               
105 See Parker, “What are Sacred Laws?” in The Law and Courts in Ancient Greece, eds. Edward M. Harris and 
Lene Rubinstein (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co, 2004) 57-71 and Connor, W. R.,“‘Sacred’ and ‘Secular’: Ἱερὰ 
καὶ ὅσια and the Classical Athenian Concept of the State,” Ancient Society 19 (1988): 161-88. 
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regularly passed decrees regarding acts of impiety and temple operation.106  In these Delphic 
inscriptions, however, the god is not invoked simply as a guarantor or witness of a legal 
procedure—Apollo plays an active role in the slave’s manumission. This practice is typically 
referred to as  “sacral manumission,” whereby one or more divinities are involved in the 
liberation of a slave (as opposed to the absence of gods in “secular manumission”). Delphi 
presents the largest body of evidence for sacral manumission, and the act of fictive sale to a god 
may have even originated there.107 But what was the purpose of framing manumission in this 
way? Why is the god Apollo present at all in these inscriptions, and how did selling a slave to the 
god translate into making that slave “free”?  
  In an effort to make sense of sacral fictive sale, some scholars have sought its origins in 
actual practice, trying to establish a historical basis from which it evolved. They have invoked 
temple slavery, the act of seeking asylum in temples, and genuine consecration of humans to 
gods as possible ancestors of sacral manumission.108 However, none of these ideas have gained 
widespread acceptance.109 Taking a different approach, Patterson has rightfully observed that 
“when the authority of the state was strong (as in Athens, Corinth, and Thebes) there was no 
need for, and no surviving evidence of, sacral manumission.”110 In other words, the presence of 
the god could have served some legitimizing role in the manumission, providing a divine 
sanction to the transaction (the real transaction between slave and owner) in places where a state 
sanction was not as possible or authoritative. Yet this does not satisfactorily explain the role of 
                                               
106 Robert Parker, “Law and Religion” in The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Law eds. Michael Gagarin 
and David Cohen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 61-81. 
107 Kamen, (2014): 285.  
108 One of the more prominent of these efforts, which incorporates many of the arguments and theories geared 
toward a historical (and more literal) basis for sacral manumission, is Sokolowski, “The Real Meaning of Sacral 
Manumission,” The Harvard Theological Review 47 (1954): 173-181.  
109 For responses to these theories, see Patterson, 237-238; Westermann, “The Freedmen and the Slaves of God,” 
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 92 (1948): 56-57; Zelnick-Abramovitz, 97-99.    
110 Patterson, 238.  
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the god as an actual party in the transaction—simply an invocation of Apollo as a witness could 
have achieved similar ends.  
 Instead of in historical or practical origins, the answer may lie in the ideological leap that 
the manumission of slaves demanded of Greek citizens. Freeing a slave necessarily involved the 
conferral of personhood onto that which had previously been regarded as property. The 
designation of the slaves as σώµατα (“bodies”) in the Delphic manumission inscriptions is itself 
indicative of the degree to which the Greeks objectified their slaves. There was a long tradition 
of free Greeks defining themselves in opposition to slaves, especially because of the association 
they maintained between “barbarism” and slavery (as many slaves were of foreign extraction). 
As a result, much of the “othering” that the Greeks employed in respect to foreign peoples, 
whether through the reasoning of environmental determinism or criticism of foreign political 
systems, applied to slaves in Greece as well.111 Weighted with all these negative ethnic 
stereotypes in addition to the disdainful qualities of servitude itself, the slave was the ideological 
antithesis to the free Greek citizen. It is therefore not surprising that slavery often served as the 
substance of ad hominem attacks in Athenian courts. One especially aggressive example is the 
invective Apollodoros employs in his speeches against his stepfather, a freedman named 
Phormion. Apollodoros calls Phormion a slave (δοῦλος) no fewer than five times,112 says that he 
is “base and unjust, and has been from the beginning, since [he left] the Anakeion”113—where 
often slave sales took place—and entreats the jurors: 
If only each of you might consider what domestic slave he left at home and imagine that 
you have suffered from him the same things that we have suffered from this man [i.e. 
Phormion]. Do not consider that each of them is Syros or Manes or something else, while 
                                               
111 Wrenhaven, 48-52.  
112 Dem. 45.75, 76, 83, 84, 85.  Observed by Kamen, “Servile Invective in Classical Athens,” Scripta Classica 
Israela 28 (2009): 49. 
113 Dem. 45.80, trans. Kamen (2009), 49. 
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this man is Phormion. The matter is the same: they are slaves, and he was a slave; you are 
masters, and I was a master.114 
 
Besides the obvious negative connotations that his references to servitude are meant to evoke, 
Apollodoros is also appealing to an “us versus them” mentality toward slaves that is likely 
already well established among the citizen jurors—his expectation of this is evident in the sheer 
number of mentions he gives to Phormion’s former life as a δοῦλος. However, Apollodoros’ 
insults toward his stepfather also illustrate that this is not simply a distinction in status; after all, 
Phormion is technically free now, and so he is in fact “something else” from Syros or Manes. 
Apollodoros’ comments are not meant to literally challenge whether Phormion is legally free. 
Rather, he means for them to paint Phormion’s character negatively, more specifically, as slave-
like. Slavery is not simply a socioeconomic or legal position, but a quality inherent in one’s very 
being. This is likely a general assumption upon which Apollodoros and many other orators115 
relied when constructing their slave-referencing attacks in court. The servile invective, as well as 
its purpose and intended effect on the jurors, says a great deal about the common attitude of the 
Greek citizens toward the slaves they owned.  
 There were many negative qualities that the Greeks attributed to the slave’s inherent 
nature, and which were typically diametrically opposed to their own. Slaves in comedy and 
oratory often appear as prone to such vices as drunkenness, laziness, intemperance, dishonesty, 
and stupidity, and as otherwise generally untrustworthy.116 There was also, noted previously, the 
scorn of the elite, most often articulated by philosophers like Aristotle, Plato, and Xenophon, 
toward craftsmanship (an occupation of many slaves) and the mental and physical weakness it 
                                               
114 Dem. 45.86, trans. Kamen (2009), 49. 
115 Such as Demosthenes and Aeschines; see Kamen (2009). 
116 Wrenhaven, 43-89.  
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produced.117 “The focus was not so much on whether slavery as an institution was justifiable but 
on what terms,” Wrenhaven observes.118 Naturally, the enslavement of another human being was 
easier to rationalize the larger the distance was between master and slave, especially if the slave 
embodied particularly negative traits and was essentially dehumanized. Of course, no discussion 
of the reduction of slaves to nonhuman status is complete without consideration of Aristotle’s 
notorious “natural slave” theory that he presents in the Politics.  
 It is worthwhile to consider how these manumissions fit within Aristotle’s theory for a 
few reasons: first, as Finley notes of Aristotle, “he produced not only the first but also the last 
formal, systematic analysis of the subject [of slavery] in antiquity, as far as we know.”119 
Additionally, Schlaifer says that it is “the most commonly held of all the later theories” on 
slavery,120 although truthfully it is difficult to know the mindset and attitudes of the general 
population in antiquity. Most significantly in respect to the Delphic manumission epigraphy, his 
theory poses the greatest ideological challenge to the notion that a slave should or can be free.  
 Aristotle treats slaves as, by their very nature, different from free men. At times he 
equates them with animals, calling an ox “the poor man’s slave,”121 affirming hunting to be a 
necessary skill for use against wild animals and uncooperative slaves,122 and commenting, 
“indeed the use made of slaves and of tame animals is not very different.”123  His reasoning lies 
in the fundamental differences in the composition of the soul; whereas reason dominates the soul 
in (free) men, and animals by contrast “obey their instincts” and cannot grasp reason,124 a slave 
                                               
117 Plat. Rep. 493d-e, 522b, 590c; Xen. Oik. 4.2-3; Arist. Pol. 1278a. 
118 Wrenhaven, 43. 
119 Finley and Shaw,  Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology (London: Markus Wiener, 1998): 120. 
120 Robert Schlaifer, “Greek Theories of Slavery from Homer to Aristotle,” in Slavery in Classical Antiquity, ed. 
Moses Finley (Cambridge: Heffer, 1968): 99. 
121 Arist. Pol., trans. Benjamin Jowett (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 1905), 1252b. 
122 Arist. Pol. 1256b. 
123 Arist. Pol. 1254b.  
124 Ibid. 
 May 2018, Final paper submitted for Wolf Humanities Center Undergraduate Research Fellowship 
Claudia Kassner, College of Arts and Sciences 2018, University of Pennsylvania  
34 
34 
“participates in rational principle enough to apprehend, but not to have, such a principle,” he 
says.125 In other words, while slaves have a share in rationality their version of it is somehow 
deficient, rendering them distinct from those people who are by nature “free”. 
 This particular constitution that Aristotle ascribes to slaves is what renders them a natural 
“living tool”, as he describes them.126 For “it is clear that the rule of the soul over the body, and 
of the mind and the rational element over the passionate, is natural and expedient; whereas the 
equality of the two or the rule of the inferior is always hurtful,” he declares127—in other words, 
the person who is born with this deficient form of rationality is at a disadvantage which renders 
the person a lesser form of what he or she could be. Mastery by those who have full faculties of 
intellect and rationality (in other words, those “free” by nature) corrects such shortcomings in the 
soul, putting to use the little capacity that the slave has (too little to allow for a meaningful and 
independent existence) in his service. “The master need only know how to order that which the 
slave must know how to execute,” Aristotle says, and this allows the masters to devote their 
abilities to philosophy or politics while the slaves devote theirs to servile work.128 Just as the 
slave makes inanimate tools, like the shuttle or lyre, useful by putting them to action (for these 
instruments cannot perform their functions on their own),129 so too the master makes the slave 
useful by enslaving him or her and harnessing the slave’s capabilities—to the master’s benefit. 
The slave-master relationship therefore, by Aristotle’s logic, allows both parties the chance to 
realize their potential.  
                                               
125 Ibid.  
126 “ἔµψυχον ὄργανον” Arist. NE 1161b. 
127 Arist. Pol. 1254b. 
128 Arist. Pol. 1255b. 
129 Arist. Pol. 1253b. 
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 Aristotle in this way consistently strains to paint slavery as something “expedient and 
right”130 by virtue of the inherent predisposition to enslavement possessed by what here appears 
as the “natural slave.” In furthering this aim, he tries to demonstrate that the master-slave 
relationship is something that is mutually beneficial. It is through this reasoning of his that 
manumission can perhaps fit into the natural slave theory. One analogy Aristotle employs in his 
discussion is that of the whole and the part—the slave being the part, the master the whole.131 
Just as a part functions in the service of the whole, the slave functions in the service of the 
master: “for example, if the whole body be destroyed, there will be no foot or hand, except in an 
equivocal sense, as we might speak of a stone hand; for when destroyed the hand will be no 
better than that.”132 While this statement reiterates the uselessness of a slave without slavery, like 
a hand without a body, it also emphasizes the “common interest” that Aristotle repeatedly 
mentions of the slave and the master.133 Though the whole takes precedence over the mere part, 
nonetheless they are bound to the same cause. As Aristotle points out, this symbiotic relationship 
places a degree of responsibility on the master to ensure the quality of the slave’s work: “that 
rule is better which is exercised over better subjects,”134 he notes, but later he warns, “The abuse 
of this authority is injurious to both; for the interests of part and whole… are the same.”135 He 
then observes that the dynamic between slave and master can be one of friendly collaboration in 
pursuit of the same aim, but that when the relationship “rests merely on law and force the reverse 
is true.”136 To a certain extent, Aristotle advocates a “carrot” method of motivation, 
acknowledging that willful cooperation of the slave yields better results than does pure “stick” 
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motivation comprised primarily of punishment and coercion. In other words, the slave will be a 
better slave if he or she is not just working because he or she is legally a slave, and so subject to 
violent compulsion. Rather, the work will improve if the slave derives some benefit from it. By 
this kind of logic, manumission could certainly serve as such a positive incentive for the slave to 
be obedient and pleasing to the master—and in fact, Aristotle almost says so himself. Later in the 
Politics, he remarks passingly, “Why it is advantageous that all slaves should have their freedom 
set before them as a reward, we will say later.”137 Later never comes, but the reasoning probably 
follows similar lines as that present in the first book of his same work. 
 For the two-thirds of the Delphic slave inscriptions which grant immediate freedom upon 
payment to the manumitted slaves, manumission can perhaps be reconciled (though admittedly 
tenuously) with Aristotle’s theory of natural slavery simply through Aristotle’s allusion to 
positive reinforcement for slave labor and his own suggestion of an offer of freedom to slaves. 
Manumission with paramone, however, can be understood through the first book of the Politics 
in another way. The master-slave relationship is only one element of household management that 
Aristotle discusses. The others are the relationship between husband and wife (predicated on the 
natural urge to produce offspring, “that the race may continue”138) and, subsequently, between 
father and children. The free man in the Politics rules over all three subjects—the slave, the wife, 
and the children.139 The natural superiority of a free man over a slave, however, differs from that 
over the wife and the child, for “the slave has no deliberative faculty at all; the woman has, but it 
is without authority, and the child has, but it is immature.”140 Aristotle therefore emphasizes that 
each of these subjects in the household is inferior to the free man in a distinctive way, the 
                                               
137 Arist. Pol. 1330a. 
138 Arist. Pol. 1252a.  
139 Arist. Pol. 1260a. 
140 Ibid.  
 May 2018, Final paper submitted for Wolf Humanities Center Undergraduate Research Fellowship 
Claudia Kassner, College of Arts and Sciences 2018, University of Pennsylvania  
37 
37 
differences in their respective capacities and in the man’s rule over them not being in degree, but 
in kind.141  
 There is one more element, however, which Aristotle says some consider to be equally a 
part of household management, and that is wealth acquisition. After consideration, Aristotle 
concludes that one kind of wealth acquisition is in fact a natural part of household management, 
but that the other kind (that of exchange and commerce) is a separate art. The former is grounded 
in one’s own property: “Property,” he says, “seems to be given by nature herself to all, both 
when they are first born and when they are grown up.” He continues, “Of the art of acquisition 
then there is one kind which by nature is a part of the management of a household, in so far as 
the art of household management must either find ready to hand, or itself provide, such things 
necessary to life, and useful for the community or state, as can be stored.”142 Accumulating such 
wealth as one’s own property yields (such as meat or materials from livestock or produce from 
farming) is indeed, in Aristotle’s opinion, a natural part of managing a household, for nature 
itself provides such products for the man and his household. He also makes it clear throughout 
the first book of the Politics that slaves, as men’s possessions, are counted among men’s 
property.143 
 Aristotle treats all of these components of managing a household separately—being the 
master to a slave, being the husband to a wife, being the father to a child, and acquiring wealth 
for the household’s upkeep and wellbeing. However, the manumission inscriptions in Delphi 
present a circumstance in which all of them are combined. In agreements, discussed previously, 
whereby the female manumitted slave agrees to bear enslaved children for the manumittor or the 
manumittor’s heirs, the slave master is co-opting—for his or her own profit—the procreative 
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relationship usually confined between husband and wife, and incorporating it into the slave-
master relationship. Following the reasoning of Aristotle’s theory of natural slavery, 
manumission therefore enables the master to extend the use of the female slave by tapping into 
her reproductive potential, and in doing so is simply engaging in the art of acquiring wealth 
through the natural yields of his own property. That the freed female slave is by nature slave-
like, and so more fit for slavery than for freedom according to Aristotle’s theory, is besides the 
point; through this kind of paramone arrangement, the slave actually becomes more useful 
through her capacities to the master in being freed than in continued enslavement. This point 
extends as well to any older slave whose manumission money goes toward the purchase of a 
younger and therefore more productive slave. As Hopkins also observes, “It was a paradox of 
classical slavery that a master maximized his profit from a valuable slave by selling him 
freedom.”144 
 Manumission can therefore conceivably be reconciled with the natural slave theory 
Aristotle presents, however only to a limited extent. Aristotle’s presentation of these ideas hardly 
holds up to careful scrutiny, with Garnsey even calling it “a battered shipwreck of a theory.”145 
Aristotle confuses cause and effect with regard to slave characteristics and behavior, with the 
result of dizzying circular logic, and he himself admits certain realities during his discussion 
(particularly that a difference exists between slavery “by law”, through enslavement following 
military defeat, and slavery “by nature”146). In truth, Aristotle’s theory, more than anything else, 
is an envisioned ideal and justification for slavery, rather than an earnest investigation into the 
true nature of the slave system. Presumably, knowing that populations defeated in war often 
served as the sources of their slaves, this constructed dichotomy served also as some reassurance 
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to the slave owning population that the masters would remain masters and were themselves 
impervious to enslavement.  
 In light of this, what Garlan calls “a ‘rhetoric of otherness’” in Greek communities,  
which “as a general rule turns the slave into the reverse of a free man—that is, a subversive 
incarnation of incompleteness and disorder,”147 there is plenty of reason to believe that many 
Greeks would have had difficulty in grappling with the ability of a slave to achieve freedom and, 
thereby, the very personhood which by principle slaves were supposed to lack. Through 
literature, art, philosophy, oratory, and, one would expect, general discourse, over centuries the 
freeborn Greeks had strictly drawn the firm line between “slave” and “free”—what meaning did 
it hold if someone could simply cross that line?  
 Boundary crossing was clearly a source of anxiety for the Greeks. Their collective unease 
with categorical confusion is manifest in their cultural tales, in which hybrid creatures are often 
disruptive forces.  A conclusion that appears repeatedly in scholarship on monstrous beings in 
Greek mythology is that a large part of the essential “monstrosity” of these fantastical characters 
is their violation of limits and structure. Strauss Clay discusses the role of hybridity in such tales:  
By definition, the monstrous is the anomalous, that which does not fit into usual 
classifications or transgresses normal limits, and hence may be considered dangerous… 
Generally speaking, Greek monsters are hybrid creatures that unite normally disparate 
elements, for example, the human and the bestial…Occasionally also, as we shall see, the 
monsters incorporate contradictory elements that violate fundamental categories, for 
instance, mortal/immortal, young/old, and male/female.148 
 
Meanwhile, the manumitted slave embodied the contradictory elements of free/slave. In his 
seven theses on monster theory, Cohen makes observations similar to Strauss Clay’s: 
 
This refusal to participate in the classificatory “order of things” is true of monsters 
generally: they are disturbing hybrids whose externally incoherent bodies resist attempts 
                                               
147 Garlan, Slavery in Ancient Greece (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 19.  
148 Strauss Clay, Hesiod’s Cosmos (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 151-152.  
 May 2018, Final paper submitted for Wolf Humanities Center Undergraduate Research Fellowship 
Claudia Kassner, College of Arts and Sciences 2018, University of Pennsylvania  
40 
40 
to include them in any systematic structuration. And so the monster is dangerous, a form 
suspended between forms that threatens to smash distinctions.149 
 
The destructive power of these monsters lies primarily in the fact that, by being able to defy 
categorization and leap boundaries, they reveal “that difference is arbitrary and potentially free-
floating, mutable rather than essential.”150 Lack of categorization means lack of order, and lack 
of order means chaos. It is not difficult to see how these fears and anxieties embodied by 
mythological monsters could be the same ones underlying the more immediate danger of status 
confusion that manumission posed to the constructed slave-free dichotomy. If a slave is able to 
transcend his or her objectified status and join the ranks of the free population (albeit not with all 
the legal and political rights of a citizen, although there are some manumitted slaves in the 
Delphic epigraphy who received citizenship and so posed further theoretical difficulties)151 then 
status is not fixed at all, but fluid—and in that case, the whole ideological system is challenged. 
The divide between slave and master becomes blurrier, and the master’s position of dominance 
becomes less secure.   
 This messiness of status that manumission presents is perhaps what Aristotle was trying 
to tidy up through his theory of “natural slavery” in the Politics. Indeed, at multiple points in his 
discussion he clearly indicates that he is responding to arguments that are contrary to his own, in 
particular those that point out that circumstance—namely, warfare—is what enslaves many 
freeborn people, who would therefore not be naturally suited to slavery.152 Of course, as 
mentioned previously, in the end his explanation is unconvincing, circuitous and contradictory as 
                                               
149 Cohen, “Monster Theory (Seven Theses),” in Monster Theory: Reading Culture ed. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996) 6.  
150 Cohen, 12.  
151 SGDI 2133, 1844 
152 Arist. Pol. 1255a.  
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it is. Despite Aristotle’s efforts to reinforce the binary, the ideological tension is clearly still 
present.   
 There is something also to be said for the agency the slave undertakes in his or her 
manumission in the Delphic manumission epigraphy, as well as in similar systems of sacral 
fictive sale. In opening up the possibility for the slave to work and save up money to purchase 
his freedom, the master to a degree provided the slave the ability to achieve upward mobility. If 
the act of crossing boundaries was a source of concern within the Greek “ideological fiction”153 
surrounding slavery,  the slave taking a deliberate and active role in this transition would 
certainly be all the more upsetting to the system. Yet, as has been seen, the benefits of 
manumission through payment by the slave, and especially through a paramone arrangement, 
were high and probably enticing to the master. There were plenty of reasons why, even in the 
face of these categorical dilemmas, a slave owner would want to make manumission possible for 
his or her slaves.   
 So then how ideologically was it possible for a σώµα to become ἐλευθέρα καὶ 
ἀνέφαπτος?154 The role of the god in the manumission may here have an explanation. Just as the 
deus ex machina comes in to resolve swiftly the problems in Greek drama that seem 
unresolvable, the god in manumission could perhaps have served a similar purpose. Like 
monsters, deities do not adhere to rules, boundaries, or categorizations. Just as a monster can 
disrupt the order, a god can restore it. If sacral manumission were simply a maneuver that 
involved a third party to act on behalf of the slave—for the slave had no legal capacity—this 
                                               
153 Kamen (2009), 55.  
154 It should be noted that that Greek communities were not actively contemplating and trying to resolve these 
concepts and conflicts—there is  little evidence for any ongoing ancient debate about the morality or rationality of 
slavery. Rather, these considerations are concerning mental processes that operate below consciousness. When a 
community such as the Greeks grapples with its collective anxieties by displacing them onto a monster or 
embodying them in servile bodies, this same community will probably employ a similar mental operation to 
reconcile the paradox of property attaining personhood that it faced.  
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could be accomplished by the intervention of another free person, as occasionally it was in 
Athens (the case of Neaira is one such example).155 Similarly, if the god’s presence was meant 
primarily to provide divine sanction to the transaction, the god could have been invoked in the 
agreement rather than included as an active party in the transaction. It is possible that either or 
both of these purposes accounts for the god’s role in sacral manumission; in fact, it seems likely 
that the god was meant to serve multiple ends in manumissions. The involvement of the god in 
the slave’s sale, however, does shift the procedure into the realm of the divine, and suggests that 
some Greeks treated manumission as something separate from the ordinary dealings of their 
human world.  
 
Conclusion 
 The manumission inscriptions in the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi, both in their high 
number and in their largely formulaic components, testify to the development of at least one 
standardized manumission procedure in Greece. However, this development should not serve as 
an indication of progress in Greek society, despite the prospect of social mobility that it seems to 
offer. Manumission was not, as it may appear, a departure from the Greek institution of slavery, 
but rather an extension of it. The act of manumitting a slave could hardly have been born 
primarily from generosity or fondness on the part of the slave owner; the conditions of too many 
of the Delphic manumissions are too severe to grant this. This epigraphic collection presents the 
many advantages, monetary profit and additional slave bodies among them, which slave owners 
could enjoy by liberating a slave through the Delphic fictive sale—especially if it included a 
paramone clause. In attaining his or her freedom through this process, a slave actually became 
implicated in the exploitative slave system by supplying money that was presumably intended 
                                               
155 Kamen (2014), 292. 
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for the purchase of another slave and, for some unfortunate women, by becoming participants in 
the negotiation of human lives as transferrable property. The involvement of a god in these 
manumissions, however, suggests that there still remained an ideological barrier to the change in 
the slaves’ status, but one that was worth overcoming to accrue the benefits. Therefore, a σῶµα 
could become a person, but only on a case-by-case basis and with divine intervention. 
Manumission, at least in Delphi, could certainly benefit the individual slave, but the practice 
overall enabled the institution of slavery in Greece to thrive.  
 It is worth noting, however, that this paper does not consider and discuss the historical 
context of this Delphic epigraphy. In the time period during which these sacral manumission 
inscriptions first appear both in Delphi and elsewhere, regions all over Greece were experiencing 
social and economic disorder; Alexander Fuks observes roughly seventy cases of  “social-
economic conflict and social-economic revolution” between the end of the fourth century and the 
middle of the second century BCE, and central Greece was one region undergoing such unrest.156 
Further investigation into how these manumission inscriptions fit within the events of this 
turbulent period, and why the practice of sacral fictive sale arose in the last decades before Rome 
took over, would surely shed more light on the slave sales to Apollo and on Greek manumission.  
                                               
156 Fuks, “Patterns and Types of Social-Economic Revolution in Greece from the Fourth to the Second Century 
B.C.,” Ancient Society 5 (1974): 59.  
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